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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 
 
Chad Flanders* 
 
Abstract 
 
Graham v.  Florida was a watershed decision, not least because of the 
centrality of the so-called “rehabilitative ideal” to its holding that life in 
prison for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes was cruel and 
unusual.  The Court’s emphasis on rehabilitation was surprising both in 
terms of the Court’s previous decisions on punishment, in which 
rehabilitation was barely included as a “purpose of punishment,” but also 
in terms of the history of academic and legislative skepticism if not hostility 
toward the idea of rehabilitation (which includes two recently decided 
sentencing cases, Tapia and Pepper).  Courts and commentators have 
struggled to make sense of both the meaning and the scope of Graham’s 
rehabilitative holding.  Their struggle is one about defining how (and 
whether) rehabilitation should play any substantial role in sentencing. 
 My essay places Graham in the context of the recent history of 
rehabilitation, and views its attempt to “rehabilitate” rehabilitation in light 
of that history.  The rehabilitative ideal encompasses not just one model, 
but three: the mostly discredited model of rehabilitation as treatment, a 
more modest model of rehabilitation as training, and an older model of 
rehabilitation as reform.  Both the language and the result of Graham show 
it to be squarely in the tradition of the third model, where rehabilitation is 
not something the state provides, but something the offender is supposed to 
undergo, through a process of reflection, remorse, and atonement.  
Rehabilitation as reform is notable because it is compatible with a 
suspicion that prison in general is a bad place for rehabilitation and that it 
is unlikely that the state can do anything to positively aid the offender in 
reforming.  At best, the state must get out of the way.  Whether we want to 
extend Graham or reject it depends on whether we find its ideal of 
rehabilitation as reform appealing.    
 
                                         
* Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University.  Visiting Professor, DePaul 
University School of Law, 2013-2014.  Thanks to Zach Hoskins for references, to William 
Berry, Will Baude, Eric Miller, John Inazu, and Chris Bradley for comments on an early 
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grateful to Lynn Branham for her wise feedback on that occasion and in conversations 
afterward.    
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Graham v. Florida,1 the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision finding a 
life without parole sentence for a non-homicide crime committed by a 
juvenile “cruel and unusual” has rightly been recognized as a “watershed.”2  
A major focus of the extensive commentary on the case has been on its 
application of the “evolving standards of decency” test to a punishment 
outside of the death penalty, and to whether Graham might apply also to 
adults.3  Equally important in Graham, but subject to much less critical 
                                         
1 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
2 E.g., Richard A Bierschbach, Proportionality and Parole 160 PENN L. REV. 1745, 1746 
(2012) (noting commentators hailed Graham as a “watershed”); Id. at n. 2 (collecting 
articles calling Graham a “landmark”).      
3 See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Graham Lets the Sun Shine In, 23 FED. 
SENT. REP. 79-80 (2010) (“Does Graham invite reconsideration of the Court’s 
extraordinary defenses embodied in its proportionality review of all noncapital sanctions, 
including term-of-years sentences short of life imprisonment [?] ….Does Graham provide 
greater protection to adults as well as juveniles”?); Rachel Barkow, Categorizing Graham 
23 FED. SENT. REP. 49 (2010) (asking how whether and how far the Court will extend 
Graham to non-capital cases); Eva S. Nilson, From Harmelin to Graham—Justice Kennedy 
Stakes Out a Path to Proportional Punishment 23 FED. SENT. REP. 67 (2010) (discussing 
what Graham might mean for the future of proportionality analysis and individualized 
sentencing).   
Other commentators have speculated on whether Graham means the Court is 
abandoning some or all of its “evolving standards of decency” test.  See Youngjae Lee, The 
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attention, is the central role that the rehabilitative theory of punishment 
plays in its holding both as a matter of rhetoric and as a matter of substance.  
A sentence to imprisonment without the possibility of parole for Graham, 
the Court explained, would foreswear “altogether the rehabilitative ideal,” 
which was unacceptable.4  “Life without the possibility of parole,” Justice 
Kennedy wrote for the Court, “gives no chance for fulfillment outside 
prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, no hope.”5  “This,” 
he concluded, “the Eighth Amendment does not permit” at least when 
dealing with those under the age of eighteen.6   The state must give 
“defendants like Graham some meaningful opportunity for release based on 
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”7 
 What is rehabilitation, and what does it mean to have it as an ideal?  
Francis Allen in his major work on the subject, The Decline of the 
Rehabilitative Ideal (from which Justice Kennedy consciously or 
unconsciously borrowed the phrase8) noted that rehabilitation was an 
inherently complex term, filled with ambiguities.9  Moreover, as the title to 
Allen books reveals, rehabilitation was, as early as the 1970s, being 
abandoned as primary justification for punishment and viewed with 
skepticism as any part of the justification for punishment.10  Kennedy’s use 
of rehabilitation was not merely surprising in the context of a Supreme 
Court opinion, where more attention is usually paid to retributive and 
                                                                                                       
Purposes of Punishment Test, 23 FED. SENT. REP. 58 (2010); John Stinneford, Evolving 
Away from Evolving Standards of Decency 23 FED. SENT. REP. 87 (2010); Ian T. Farrell, 
Abandoning Objective Indicia, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 302 (2013).   
4 Graham, at 74. 
5 Id. at 79.    
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 75.   
8 The first use seems to be in Francis Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the 
Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 226, 230 (1959);  see also FRANCIS A. ALLEN, 
THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 25-41 (1964) and ALLEN, infra note 9; see also 
Fred Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative Idea: The View from Mempa v. 
Rhay, 47 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1968). 
9 FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 2 (1981) (hereinafter 
ALLEN, DECLINE) (“The rehabilitative ideal concept requires description and application.  It 
is not surprising to discover that the phrase embraces great complexity and, indeed, 
encompasses widely different and even conflicting kinds of social policies.”); id at 52 
(“Ambiguities afflict the very notion of what rehabilitation consists.”).  See more recently, 
United States v. Williams, 793 F.3d 1065-1066 (2d Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.) (“[C]ritically the 
defendant misses the ambiguity in the term “rehabilitation” [more precisely, “correctional 
rehabilitation”] as used in discussions of criminal punishment.”).    
10 ALLEN, DECLINE, supra note 7, at 5-7 (explaining the nearly “unchallenged sway of the 
rehabilitative ideal” in the mid-twentieth century).  Cp FRANCIS T. CULLEN, REAFFIRMING 
REHABILIATION (2d., 2012).   
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deterrent theories;11 it was surprising in the context of punishment theory 
and practice more generally.12  The punishment literature and the literature 
on Graham has not yet come to grips the full implication of the Graham 
decision because it has incompletely understood the meanings of 
“rehabilitation.”13 
 My paper gives an overview of the Supreme Court’s engagement 
with the “rehabilitative ideal” in Graham as well as two other recent cases.  
In the first part, I sketch three broad models of that ideal: rehabilitation as 
treatment, rehabilitation as training, and rehabilitation as reform.  The first 
(“rehabilitation as treatment”) is, in its most familiar variant, the most 
ambitious.  It suggests nothing less than a complete overhaul of both the 
theory and practice of criminal justice by redefining crime as a “sickness” 
and punishment as a “cure.”14  It is this version that has suffered the greatest 
decline over the past half century even though it did (at one point) strongly 
influence Supreme Court doctrine.15  The second model, rehabilitation as 
training, is less ambitious, and for perhaps that reason, has endured as a part 
of sentencing.16  It too, however, has been the object of vigorous critique.  
The third model, rehabilitation as reform, has been prominent in 
philosophical discussions of punishment and less on display in legal 
doctrine and practice.17  But it is this model, however, that may best explain 
the use of rehabilitative theory in Graham.18          
 The second and third parts of my essay move from rehabilitative 
theory to legal practice.  In two cases decided in the same year (2011), 
United States v. Tapia19 and United States v. Pepper,20 the Supreme Court 
has considered the use of rehabilitation in sentencing under the Sentencing 
                                         
11 See e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 989 (1991) (mentioning rehabilitation 
only in passing, and dismissively).  
12 Casebooks and treatises by and large treat rehabilitation as at best a failure in practice 
and at worst a failed ideal.  See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN GARVEY, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 37 (6th ed., 2012) (“The conventional wisdom is that past 
efforts to rehabilitate convicted offenders were mostly unsuccessful.”); Id at 38 (“Even 
assuming that rehabilitative measures work, can you think of any moral objection to 
rehabilitation as a justification for imposing punishment?”). 
13 For early efforts to grasp the meaning of Graham which I am indebted to, see Alice 
Ristroph, Hope, Imprisonment, and the Constitution, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 75 (2010); Cara 
H. Drinan, Graham on the Ground, 87 WASH. L. REV. 51 (2012).   
14 See infra Part II.A 
15 See e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). 
16 See infra Part II.B. 
17 See infra Part II.C 
18 See infra Part IV.C 
19 131 S.Ct. 2382 (2011). 
20 131 S.Ct. 1229 (2011). 
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Reform Act.21  The cases point in superficially opposite directions (Tapia 
opposes rehabilitation as a factor to be used in extending a prison term;22 
Pepper allows consideration of rehabilitation in resentencing23) but both 
testify to Court’s wrestling with the role (both positive and negative) 
rehabilitation should have in sentencing.  These cases are important, but 
have been almost universally ignored in the literature on sentencing.24  
Ultimately, they are testament to the prevailing anti-rehabilitative trend in 
both legislative and judicial fora.   
 The third part of the essay is devoted almost wholly to Graham, the 
first Supreme Court case in decades to rely heavily on rehabilitative theory 
in its reasoning.  It is no exaggeration to say that without depending on 
rehabilitation, the Court could not have concluded the way it did in 
Graham.  Rehabilitation is the key to the Graham opinion.  But Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion is frustratingly unclear as to what he means by 
rehabilitation or the rehabilitative ideal.25  While some elements of 
Kennedy’s opinion imply rehabilitation as treatment, and his concern that 
juveniles in prison have access to vocational and education programs 
suggests rehabilitation as training, the best interpretation of rehabilitation in 
Graham is as a case that treats rehabilitation as a kind of moral reform.  
Understanding better what kind of rehabilitation Kennedy was after in 
Graham helps us better understand how to apply Graham in future cases as 
well as showing us the limitations of that decision. Graham’s model of 
rehabilitation as reform is in many ways a conservative vision (in several 
senses of that word) but not one without potential to change sentencing in 
ways small and large.26        
 
II. THREE MODELS OF REHABILITATION 
 
 Rehabilitation has a long history as a part of punishment theory but 
my purpose here is not to recount that history.  Others have done it ably, 
charting rehabilitation’s rise in the mid-twentieth century and its rapid 
                                         
21 Tapia, at 2390; Pepper, at 1247. 
22 See Tapia, at 2391 (“Section 3582(a) precludes sentencing courts from imposing or 
lengthening a prison term to promote an offender’s rehabilitation.”). 
23 See Pepper, at 1241 (“[A] district court may consider evidence of a defendant’s 
rehabilitation since his prior sentencing.”). 
24 The main exception is Professor Paul Berman’s posts on Sentencing Law and Policy.  
See, e.g., The Interesting Issues Raised by Tapia, SENTENCING LAW & POLICY (Dec. 10, 
2010); Pepper Providing a Bit of Spice to SCOTUS Sentencing Docket, SENTENCING LAW 
& POLICY (Aug. 26, 2010). 
25 See Part III, infra.   
26 See infra Part IV.C 
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decline into near irrelevance.27  Early rehabilitationists had high hopes that 
punishment and prison could change into something different than they 
were, but those hopes swiftly came crashing down: empiricists questioned 
whether rehabilitation could ever work (offenders sent to prison seemed not 
to benefit from vocational and educational programs: when released from 
prison, they fell back into a life of crime); theorists attacked what it saw as 
rehabilitation’s unappealing presuppositions (that prisoners were not evil, 
but merely “sick” and needed to be held indefinitely so they could be 
“cured” by the state).  By the 1980s, if not sooner, many were wondering 
how we could have ever thought prison could be a place for rehabilitation 
rather than purely a place for suffering and punishment.  In broad outline, 
the shape of the story should be familiar and parts of the history will 
inevitably creep into my analysis.  
What I want to do here is to isolate three models of the rehabilitative 
ideal which have had particular influence over the last hundred or so years 
in America law.  In order to understand why the rehabilitative ideal was in 
decline, we need to be straight that the rehabilitative ideal was not a single 
thing; it was plural.  Moreover, some of the rehabilitative models were more 
modest than others and each model came in different varieties as well, 
which also ran from the modest to the ambitious.  The models are not 
completely discrete, of course, and at points they can blend into one 
another.  Indeed, in some respects, the models are not mutually exclusive.  
Nonetheless, I believe they are separate enough to be called separate 
“models” because in rough outline they have distinguishing features and 
characteristics.   I start with the model that, in the minds of many, was 
almost thoroughly discredited in theory and which never really took hold in 
practice.  At the same time, traces of its influence continue to this day.28 
 
                                         
27 See generally, ALLEN, DECLINE, supra note 7; KATE STITH & JOSE CABRANES, FEAR OF 
JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998) (hereinafter STITH, 
FEAR), ch. 1 (“Sentencing Reform in Historical Perspective”); Douglas Berman, 
Conceptualizing Booker, 38 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 387 (2006); Meghan Ryan, Science and the 
New Rehabilitation, 5-16 (unpublished manuscript, Aug. 8, 2012); Michael Vitiello, 
Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 1011 (1991).   
A very brief version of the story figures importantly in Justice Roberts’ dissent in 
Miller.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2478 (2012). (“In this case, there is little doubt 
about the direction of society's evolution: For most of the 20th century, American 
sentencing practices emphasized rehabilitation of the offender and the availability of 
parole. But by the 1980's, outcry against repeat offenders, broad disaffection with the 
rehabilitative model, and other factors led many legislatures to reduce or eliminate the 
possibility of parole, imposing longer sentences in order to punish criminals and prevent 
them from committing more crimes.”) 
28 See infra Part III.B (discussion of Pepper and its relation to certain tenets of 
rehabilitation as treatment). 
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A.  Rehabilitation as Treatment 
 
 At its most extreme, the rehabilitative ideal was not merely to 
supplement or revise punishment, it was to replace punishment.  “Crime” 
and “punishment” were crude, primitive ideas29 and had “no place in the 
scientific vocabulary.”30  The more humane and enlightened perspective 
was to treat crime as an illness that needed to be treated.  Jailers and judges 
were out; doctors and therapists were in.31  They had the necessary 
expertise to guide a person away from his criminal, antisocial behavior and 
to reenter society: they could diagnosis the causes of the illness and 
recommend a course of action.32  “The management of such [penal] 
institutions much be scientific,” one rehabilitation as treatment theorist 
wrote “and the care of their inmates must be scientific, since a grave crime 
is always a manifestation of the pathological condition of the individual.”33   
On the therapeutic version of rehabilitation, crime was a most of all 
a signal to the criminological “experts” that a person needed not 
punishment, but treatment. – in the way that a rash or a cold might be a 
signal to doctors that care was needed.34  How much treatment, and for how 
long, was up to the expert.  When treatment was completed, he “prisoner, 
like the doctor’s other patients, should emerge … a different person, 
differently equipped, differently functioning, and headed in a different 
direction from when he began the treatment.”35  At the limit, if the offender 
could not successfully reenter society, experts would be able to treat him in 
a clinical setting to allow him a comfortable and protective (if forever 
confined) existence.    
                                         
29 Karl Menninger, Love Against Hate, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT (Stanely E. Grupp ed. 
1971) at 248; see also id. at 245.   
30 Karl Menninger, Therapy, Not Punishment 47 in PUNISHMENT AND THE DEATH 
PENALTY, THE CURRENT DEBATE (Robert M.  Baird & Stuard E. Rosenbaum, eds., 1995).   
31 See President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The 
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 163 (USGSPO 1967) (analogizing criminal offenders 
to patients). 
32 See, e.g., Henry Weihofen, Punishment and Treatment: Rehabilitation in THEORIES OF 
PUNISHMENT (Stanely E. Grupp ed. 1971)  at 259 (For the rehabilitative ideal, “Human 
behavior is the product of antecedent causes.  These causes can be identified, and it is the 
function of the scientists to discover and describe them.  Knowledge of the antecedents of 
human behavior is essential for scientific control of that behavior.”); Herbert Morris, 
Persons and Punishment, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT (Stanely E. Grupp ed. 1971)  at 82 
(discussing rehabilitation as treatment). 
33 Enrico Ferri, The Positive School of Criminology, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT (Stanely 
E. Grupp ed. 1971) at 236. 
34 Menninger, Love Against Hate, supra note 25, at 246 (“I would say that according to the 
prevalent understanding of the words, crime is not a disease.  Neither is it an illness, 
although I think it should be!  It should be treated, and it could be, but mostly isn’t”).   
35 Id. at 246-47.   
8 THE SUPREME COURT AND THE REHABILIATIVE IDEAL 
 The therapeutic ideal of rehabilitation seemed to many to be naively 
optimistic in its assumptions: that the causes of crime could be diagnosed, 
that a cure can be administered, and that we could do away with 
“punitiveness” of punishment.36  We are much less sanguine now.37  But 
philosophers and policy-makers responding to rehabilitation as treatment at 
the time (and they were legion) saw something much more sinister; they did 
not object to rehabilitation as treatment as impractical.  They rejected the 
ideal of rehabilitation as treatment altogether qua ideal.38  They saw a 
worldview that treated human beings less as agents as more as patients who 
could be hospitalized or imprisoned and “treated” indefinitely not for the 
safety of society, but supposedly “for their own good.”    
In addition, there was something dehumanizing about being told that 
your crime was not a free act but instead a sickness.  Not only was this 
factually incorrect (criminals had not “come down” with anything39), it was 
dangerous. Novels such as Clockwork Orange and One Flew Over the 
Cuckoo’s Nest described the frightful implications of a society run by 
experts where one’s freedom depending on convincing doctors and nurses 
that you had been successfully “cured.”40  There was something simpler and 
clearer, if not more ennobling, about saying that one was being punished 
because one deserved it (it was a matter of justice) or that society needed to 
lock you up to protect itself.41  These theories did not carry with them the 
implication that you were somehow diseased or sick and in need of a 
doctor’s care.  They treated you as a person: rehabilitation as treatment, by 
contrast, was “not a response to a person who is at fault.  We respond to an 
individual, not because of what he has done, but become of some condition 
                                         
36 See, e.g., Shepard v. Taylor, 556 F.2d 648, 650 (2d Cir. 1977) (“The instant controversy 
arises out of the recent tendency to reject the so-called ‘rehabilitative ideal’ as a relic of an 
earlier, more optimistic, era and to return to traditional criteria of retribution and deterrence 
in punishing juvenile offenders.”). 
37 See the analysis of the optimism of early rehabilitative theories in ALLEN, DECLINE, 
supra note 7, ch. 1.   
38 For powerful philosophical criticism about the assumptions and prescriptions of 
rehabilitation as treatment, see, inter alia, Richard Wasserstrom, Punishment v. 
Rehabiliation 51 in  PUNISHMENT AND THE DEATH PENALTY, THE CURRENT 
DEBATE (Robert M.  Baird & Stuard E. Rosenbaum, eds., 1995); C.S. Lewis, The 
Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT (Stanely E. Grupp ed. 
1971) at 301; Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in id. at 76.   
39 E.g., MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 40 (1973) 
(“Many convicted criminals … are not driven by, or ‘acting out,’ neurotic or psychotic 
impulses.  Instead, they have coldly and deliberately figured the odds …”).   
40 See generally ANTHONY BURGESS, CLOCKWORK ORANGE (1962); KEN KESEY, ONE 
FLEW OVER THE CUCKOO’S NEST (1962).  For a more philosophical version of this worry, 
see MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH  (1975).   
41 Lewis, supra note 34, at 307-308.   
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from which he is suffering.”42 
 However aggressively rehabilitation as treatment was attacked in 
theory (and it seems clear that in the minds of most people that it has been 
thoroughly defeated), it left its mark on Supreme Court doctrine.  In the 
1949 case Williams v. New York, the Supreme Court not only agreed with 
but seemed to embrace the idea that punishment had to be tailored to the 
criminal offender, or “individualized.” 43 The idea was straight from the 
literature on rehabilitation as treatment:44 the effective diagnosis is one that 
treats the person and his disease; there could be no “one size fits all” 
prescription, because each person’s need and propensity for rehabilitation 
differed.45 The statute at issue in the case, the Court said, “emphasize[d] a 
prevalent modern philosophy of penology that the punishment should fit the 
offender and not merely the crime.” 46  “The belief no longer prevails,” the 
Court announced, as if ringing out an older, less enlightened era “that every 
offense in a like legal category calls for an identical punishment without 
regard to the past life and habits of a particular offender.”47  
Moreover, for rehabilitation as treatment, the prescription should be 
made by an expert, using all the relevant information the expert could 
gather, taking into consideration “not only static and presently observable 
factors, but dynamic and historical factors, and factors of environmental 
interaction and change.”48  The expert would look into “the future of 
correction, re-education, and prevention.”49  For the Supreme Court, the 
expert were sentencing judges and parole officers,50 and in Williams, the 
Court maintained that the judge had to have access to a full sentencing 
report (including, but not limited to, information about the crime the 
                                         
42 Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT (Stanely E. 
Grupp ed. 1971)  at 83.   
43 Williams v. New York, 377 U.S. 241; United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978); 
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979).  I 
am indebted to Berman’s account of all these cases in the discussion that follows.  Berman, 
Conceptualizing Booker, supra note 24, at 388-393. 
44 Henry Weihofen, Punishment and Treatment: Rehabilitation in THEORIES OF 
PUNISHMENT (Stanely E. Grupp ed. 1971) at 257 (“A rehabilitative approach is necessarily 
an individual approach”).   
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 248 
47 Id.   
48 Menninger, Therapy, supra note 26, at 46.  
49 Id.   
50 On the pure rehabilitation as treatment model, judges would eventually surrender the 
sentencing role entirely to experts.  Menninger, Therapy, supra note 26, at 47; STITH, FEAR 
at 17, 20.  Judges with full information (e.g., what was contained in a pre-sentencing 
report) were a second-best option.  Karl Menninger, Love Against Hate, in THEORIES OF 
PUNISHMENT (Stanely E. Grupp ed. 1971)  at 244; Sheldon Glueck, Principles of a 
Rational Penal Code in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT (Stanely E. Grupp ed. 1971)  at 279.    
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offender was being punished for) in order to make a suitable 
recommendation as to punishment.  The report would include such 
information about the convicted person’s “past life, health, habits, conduct, 
and mental and moral propensities.”51   
The Court underlined that the reason why the judge needed this 
information was so that he could recommend a punishment that would best 
serve to rehabilitate and reform him.  A “strong motivating force” for 
individualizing punishment, the Court wrote, “has been the belief that, by 
careful study of the lives and personalities of convicted offenders, many 
could be less severely punished and restored sooner to complete freedom 
and useful citizenship.”52  In a note, the Court favorably cited a prominent 
rehabilitation as treatment proponent53 and declared in the text of the 
opinion that “Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal 
law.  Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important 
goals of criminal jurisprudence.”54  In order to serve the goals of 
rehabilitation and reform, judges needed to have the freedom to range 
beyond facts about the offense, in order to individually tailor sentences.55  
The Supreme Court in Williams was signing on, at least in part, to the 
rehabilitation as treatment program.56  It would reaffirm its support again 
over the years.57     
 The fact that Williams tied individualization in sentencing to 
rehabilitative goals is important, because individualization is not 
intrinsically tied to rehabilitation.  Individual tailoring can be backward-
looking and retributive or forward-looking and rehabilitative.  If the judge is 
                                         
51 337 U.S. at 245. 
52 Id. at 249. 
53 See id. at n.13 (“It should be obvious that a proper [sentencing] . . . involves a study of 
each case upon an individual basis . . . Is the criminal a man so constituted and so 
habituated to war upon society that there is little or no real hope that he ever can be 
anything other than a menace to society – or is he obviously amenable to reformation?”) 
(quoting SHELDON GLUECK, PROBATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 133 (1933)). 
54 Id. at 248. 
55 See also Grayson, at 46-47 (addressing need for “informed judgment” concerning 
potential for rehabilitation); Greenholtz.  It seems somewhat ironic that the Court in 
Williams was affirming a death sentence, justified along rehabilitative lines.  But it may be 
that some are beyond rehabilitation, and so deserve death.  It may also be that death could 
induce some to reform, at least in the short time that they have left.     
56 Berman, Conceptualizing Booker, supra note 24, at 389 (“In 1949, the Supreme Court 
constitutionalized [the rehabilitative] approach to sentencing in Williams…”); TAMASAK 
WICHARAYA, SIMPLE THEORY, HARD REALITY: THE IMPACT OF SENTENCING REFORM ON 
COURTS, PRISONS, AND CRIME 30 (1995) (“Penal policy in the therapeutic state was even 
endorsed by the  United States Supreme Court”). 
57 See e.g., Grayson, 438 U.S.  at 41; Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 1; see generally Berman, 
supra note 56, at 392 (describing later opinions in which the Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
connection between individualization and rehabilitation).    
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looking at details the offender (details which even may be beyond the crime 
he was convicted of) about to find out what he deserves as his punishment, 
then the judge’s individualizing is backward-looking: he is trying to fit the 
offender to the right amount of deserved retributive punishment.  The Court 
has used this model in recent cases, including one involving juvenile 
sentencing.58   
But if the judge is using those same details to determine how much 
rehabilitation the offender needs – as well as his fitness for rehabilitation – 
the judge’s individualizing is forward looking.  He is trying to fit the 
offender to the right kind of “cure,” given the offender’s situation.  It was 
with this kind of ideal in mind that the Williams Court favorably cited 
rehabilitation as a goal of punishment.  It is evident, too, in the Court’s 
emphasis on the judge not just finding a just punishment, but also an 
“enlightened one,” and why the judge needed information that went beyond 
the information supplied by the guilty verdict.59   
 Individual tailoring for rehabilitation lies somewhere on a 
continuum between individualization for retribution (individualization that 
is backward looking) and the rehabilitation as treatment model’s ideal, 
which is fully indefinite sentences and not merely indeterminate ones.60  On 
the rehabilitation as treatment model, it is not enough to simply make a 
prospective judgment about someone’s ability to be cured, but an ongoing 
one.  No, the sentence must be continually reevaluated, and “the convicted 
offender would be detained indefinitely pending a decision as to whether 
and how and when to reintroduce him successfully into society.”61  Those 
who are cured can be released; for those who do not respond to treatment, 
we must provide for their “indefinitely continued confinement.”62  The 
experts in the rehabilitation as treatment model could not be chained to any 
guidelines or other limitations as to how long sentences could be.   
 
                                         
58 See infra Part IV.C at note 162. 
59 Id. at 390-91.    
60 By indefinite sentencing, I mean to indicate an in principle indefinite sentence; an 
indeterminate sentence can be confined within a specific range, or be subject to a 
maximum.  See Sheldon Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code in THEORIES OF 
PUNISHMENT (Stanely E. Grupp ed. 1971) at 291; United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 
165 (1997) (Stevens J., dissenting) (Williams was a case that dealt with “the exercise of the 
sentencing judge’s discretion within the range authorized by law, rather than with rules 
defining the range within which discretion may be exercised.”). 
61 Menninger, Therapy, supra note 26, at 44; Ferri, The Positive School, supra note 29, at 
236 (“We maintain that congenital or pathological criminals cannot be locked up for a 
definite term in any institution, but should remain there until they are adapted for the 
normal life of society.”).   
62 Menninger, Therapy, supra note 26, at 45.   
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B.  Rehabilitation as Training 
 
   Rehabilitation as treatment wanted a paradigm shift in how we 
thought of crime and punishment, a shift that the Supreme Court at least 
partially endorsed in Williams and its progeny.63   At the limit, the shift led 
some to wonder whether rehabilitation as treatment was a theory of 
punishment at all, and instead was a theory of what to put in place of 
punishment.64  But rehabilitation has over the years also taken on a more 
hum-drum connotation, which is far from the radical ambitious of 
rehabilitation as treatment.  What I will call “rehabilitation as training” 
emphasized not a cure for crime, but rather piecemeal efforts at the 
betterment of inmates through vocational training and education or by drug 
treatment.  The goal was not that the inmate be totally healed of his 
criminological tendencies (whatever that would mean) but that he become 
more fit to reenter society as a productive and contributing member.  He 
would be prepared to find a job upon release, or be able to enter and 
maintain a stable relationship, or simply be more equipped to cope with 
day-to-day life. For juvenile offenders, such programs could include “trade 
training in metal and woodwork . . . summer camp with work and 
recreational programs which keep the boys out of doors . . . [and] 
agriculture and stock raising.”65 
Sentences on the rehabilitation as training view would (like those 
made according to the rehabilitation as treatment view) still would need to 
be individualized, to an extent.  We would need to discover what training 
programs would be appropriate for the offender, and this required having a 
particularized knowledge of his background and his capacities.  The 
rehabilitation as training model, in short, kept the focus on individualized 
punishment for the benefit of the offender but shifted the form of 
rehabilitation from therapy and treatment to training.  The training might be 
expected to make the defendant a productive member of society, or at least 
get him to stop committing crimes (or, preferably both).66  It did not involve 
                                         
63 See infra I.B.   
64 WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW (5th ed., 2010) (“It is perhaps not entirely correct to call 
this treatment ‘‘punishment,’’ as the emphasis is away from making him suffer and in the 
direction of making his life better and more pleasant.”).   
65 United States v. Won Cho, 730 F.2d 1260, 1275-76 (9th Cir. 1984) (“In enacting the 
Youth Corrections Act of 1950, Congress envisioned a rehabilitative program that included 
‘trade training in metal and woodwork . . . summer camp with work and recreational 
programs which keep the boys out of doors . . . [and] agriculture and stock raising.’”) 
(quoting H.R.Rep. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1950 U.S. Code Cong. 
Serv. 3983, 3987). 
66 United States v. Williams, 793 F.3d at 1065-1066 (Rehabilitation “often has rather 
utopian overtones—easing the defendant's transition to community life, making him a 
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treating him as a patient in any sustained way: even the person in drug 
treatment was not “sick,” but just needed help getting off his feet.67 
 Nearly all versions of rehabilitation as training had their wings 
clipped in the second half of the twentieth Century.  In a hugely influential 
essay,68 Robert Martinson surveyed over 200 studies regarding the effects 
of various training programs in prison.  What he found was that, in the 
phrase that was to become famous “nothing worked”: no training program 
seemed to be effective in decreasing recidivism rates.69   “With few and 
isolated exceptions,” Martinson wrote, “the rehabilitative efforts that have 
been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism.”70 If the 
goal of training was to get inmates to be able to deal successfully in the real 
world, then the failure to prevent recidivism was a serious indictment of 
rehabilitation as training.  It meant that time in training programs was doing 
nothing to curb the behavior that got offenders in trouble in the first place.  
Prison with rehabilitation thrown in was not making anyone better and 
prison might have even been making them worse.71   
 The model of rehabilitation as training subsequently became even 
more modest.  It did not hold out the purpose of punishment was training, as 
in: we send people to prison so that they can enroll in vocational and 
educational training.  Instead, it became the idea that if offenders were 
going to be in prison anyway, then it could not hurt to also give them 
training.  It might not help, either, but it was an acceptable alternative to 
doing nothing.  The purpose of punishment may not be rehabilitation (as the 
rehabilitation as treatment people believed, and as some of the more 
                                                                                                       
productive, law-abiding member of society. … A more modest conception of rehabilitation, 
however, is that a defendant is rehabilitated when he ceases committing crimes, at least 
crimes of the gravity of the crime for which he was convicted, whether or not he becomes a 
productive member of society.”). 
67 An assumption that provides the background for the Tapia decision.  See infra Part III.B.  
See also Powell v. Texas 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (rejecting idea of alcoholism as a “disease”).   
68There is considerable debate over whether the influence of this essay is justified, and 
whether the essay truly did conclude what people said it did; that it did have an influence, 
and that influence contributed to the decline of the rehabilitative ideal, is nearly undisputed.   
69 See also ALLEN, DECLINE, supra note 7, at 57.   
70 Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, PUB. 
INT. 22, 25 (Spring 1973) (emphasis omitted).   
71  But see United States v. Hopkins, 531 F.2d 576 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“The conclusions of 
those who have critically examined programs implemented during the rise of the era of the 
‘rehabilitative ideal’ with regard to their efficacy in reducing recidivism and tendency to be 
used to justify substantial encroachments on liberty should be carefully considered in our 
rethinking of the intended goals of our system of criminal justice. Although one cannot 
help but be disillusioned by such failures, it is important not to give up all hope. These 
failures may be attributable, at least in part, to the dearth of resources committed to making 
rehabilitative programs in institutions work, and the often haphazard manner by which such 
programs are implemented.”). 
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optimistic rehabilitation as training advocates proposed), but it could be a 
place where some rehabilitation might occur. The fact that rehabilitation 
doesn’t work all that well shouldn’t be a deterrent to having rehabilitation at 
all.  As the Court put it in Greenholtz, “The fact that anticipations and hopes 
for rehabilitation programs have fallen far short of expectations of a 
generation ago need not lead states to abandon hopes for those 
objectives.”72  Maybe rehabilitation programs worked, even if they didn’t 
work “spectacularly.”73     
In his classic opinion in Bergman v. United States, Judge Marvin 
Frankel gave clear form to the emerging wisdom about rehabilitation as 
training.  “[T]his Court,” Frankel wrote, “shares the growing understanding 
that no one should ever be sent to prison for rehabilitation.”74  Nonetheless, 
“[i]f someone must be imprisoned – for other, valid reasons – we should 
seek to make rehabilitative resources available to him or her.”75  
Rehabilitation could remain a goal and a resource for those already in 
prison, but it could no longer be the goal of punishment,76 a position that 
would later became codified.77 
 
C.  Rehabilitation as Moral Reform 
 
 There is a third model of rehabilitation that is important to point out, 
and its ambitions lie somewhere in between rehabilitation as treatment and 
rehabilitation as training.  Rehabilitation as reform, as I shall call it, can be 
helpfully compared and contrasted with rehabilitation as treatment.  Like 
rehabilitation as treatment, rehabilitation as reform emphasizes not just 
making the offender a fitter, more productive member of society, but in 
fundamentally changing him.  Unlike rehabilitation as treatment, however, 
this change is not along the lines of a medical paradigm where the offender 
is sick and needs to be cured.  Rather, the offender needs moral education: 
he needs to learn that what he has done was wrong, and to (at least) feel 
                                         
72 442 U.S., at 13. 
73 See JOEL SAMAHA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 500 (7th ed. 2006). 
74 United States v. Bergman, 416 F.Supp. 496, 499 (S.D.N.Y.1976). 
75 Id. 
76 See id. (“[T]he goal of rehabilitation cannot fairly serve in itself as grounds for the 
sentence to confinement.”).  See also Greenholtz, at 13-14 (“The objective of rehabilitating 
convicted persons to be useful, law-abiding members of society can remain a goal no 
matter how disappointing the progress.  But it will not contribute to these desirable 
objectives to invite or encourage a continuing state of adversary relations between society 
and the inmate.”). 
77 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (2006) (“The Commission shall insure that the guidelines 
reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for the 
purpose of rehabilitating the defendant or providing the defendant with needed educational 
or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.”). 
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remorse over it.  The offender is not supposed just to “fit in,” he is supposed 
to become almost a different person, a “reformed” person through a process 
of moral reflection.  The idea of rehabilitation as reform has not figured 
much in recent jurisprudence (the exception to this, I will argue, is Graham) 
although it has recently enjoyed a renewed vogue in moral and political 
theory.78    
 The idea of rehabilitation as moral reform is in fact a very old idea, 
if not the oldest, association between punishment and rehabilitation.79  It is 
at least as old as the penitentiary, where convicts were meant to go and, in 
solitude, reflect on their wrongs and show penance for them.80  We punish 
with the hope that this will induce the offender to reform; but punishment is 
only the necessary condition for this moral reform, it is not a sufficient one.  
In the phrasing of Walter Moberly, rehabilitation as reform is not about 
reform while punishment, but reform by punishing.  “Many thinkers who 
speak of the State’s duty to reform by punishing really mean a duty to 
reform as well as to punish. …  But such improvement is not due to the 
penal aspects of prison life.  On the contrary, it is achieved in spite of them, 
if at all.”81  Rehabilitation as training might view rehabilitation as 
something that goes on during punishment, but this is not the vision of 
rehabilitation as reform.  Reform is supposed to come about by being 
punished. “Only the latter idea,” writes Hastings Rashdall, “should be 
thought as accepting reform as a goal of punishment.”82   
It is not obvious how this reform was supposed to happen.  Perhaps 
being punished was enough to induce in the offender feelings of remorse 
                                         
78 For good recent statements see Zachary Hoskins, Punishment, Contempt, and the 
Prospect of Moral Reform, CRIM. J. ETHICS (March 2013); Steven Sverdlik, Punishment 
and Reform (2012), available at 
http://digitalrepository.smu.edu/hum_sci_philosophy_research/1.  See also WALTER 
MOBERLY, THE ETHICS OF PUNISHMENT (1968); Jean Hampton, The Moral Education 
Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 208 (1984) and ANTONY DUFF, 
PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY (2001); Herbert Morris, A Paternalistic 
Theory of Punishment  in WHY PUNISH? HOW MUCH? 179 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011). 
79 It arguably is present in Plato.  Plato, Punishment as Cure, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT (Gertrud Ezorsky ed. 1977) at 37; J.E. McTaggart, Hegel’s 
Theory of Punishment in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT (Gertrud Ezorsky 
ed. 1977) at 40.     
80 See the discussion by Stith and Cabranes of the “civic ideal of reformation through 
punishment” in STITH, FEAR at 15 (“Associated most prominently with the Pennsylvania 
Quaker physician Benjamin Rush and his friend Benjamin Franklin, the ideal of personal 
reformation was at the heart of the movement to transform existing penal institutions into 
more humane institutions of treatment and reform.”); see also DAVID ROTHMAN, THE 
DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM (1971).    
81 WALTER MOBERLY, THE ETHICS OF PUNISHMENT 123 (1968).   
82 HASTINGS RASHDALL, 1 THE THEORY OF GOOD AND EVIL 292 (1924).  
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and repentance.83  Perhaps it was through being isolated from outside, 
corrupting influences.84  Or perhaps it was a little of both.  As de Beaumont 
and de Toqeuveville explained in their survey of American prisons: 
 
Thrown into solitude [the prisoner] reflects.  Placed alone, in view 
of this crime, he learns to hate it; and if his soul be not yet surfeited 
with crime, and thus have lost all taste for anything better, it is in 
solitude, where remorse will come to assail him. … Can there be a 
combination more powerful for reform than that of a prison which 
hands over the prisoner to all the trials of solitude, leads him through 
reflection to remorse, through religion to hope?85 
  
For rehabilitation as reform, other people (judges, jailors) cannot 
themselves directly cause moral reform.  Doctors and experts cannot do it, 
nor can vocational counselors or psychologists, although perhaps they can 
help at the margins.  Training may be a good way to show you have 
reformed, but it is possible to be well-trained but not morally reformed.  
You could be an excellent worker or student, but a bad person.  Only your 
own efforts, the hard work of reflection, can lead you to remorse, 
repentance, and hope.    
The model of rehabilitation as reform in its expectation of what the 
prisoner was supposed to achieve rivals rehabilitation as treatment in its 
ambition.  Your time in prison was meant to cure you, not in the sense that 
you were sick and now you are well, but in the sense that you were morally 
corrupt and now you are morally pure (or more pure).  In some more 
aggressive versions, the very purpose of punishment is that it can induce 
this reform: we punish you so that you will reform yourself.  In a less 
ambitious version, rehabilitation as moral reform requires that prison should 
not hinder the goal of moral reform (where punishment might be justified 
on other grounds).86  At minimum, prison could not be a place where you 
came out brutalized and degraded.87   
In either its more or less ambitious versions, however, the goal of 
moral reform is fundamentally incompatible with rehabilitation as 
treatment.  The therapeutic model dispenses with remorse and regret (do we 
feel guilty for having a cold or for having gout?) and places the prisoner in 
                                         
83 As emphasized by McTaggart, supra note 68, at 51.   
84  See generally D. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM 71 (1971).    
85 Gustave de Beaumont & Alexis de Tocqueville, ON THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE 55, 84 (1883). 
86 See Hoskins, supra note 67, at 11 (punishment should not undermine prospects for 
reform). 
87 Morris, A Paternalistic Theory of Punishment, supra note 78, at 158.   
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the hands of a doctor.  Moral reform, by contrast, requires that the offender 
accept his responsibility and to strive to atone for it; he undergoes a kind of 
“secular penance.”88  In this respect, moral reform is often tied to 
retributivism, but it is, I believe, distinct from it.  Retribution at its core says 
that people deserve to be punished.89  It says nothing about whether those 
who are punished believe that they are responsible or that they should show 
remorse for what they have done.90  Moral reform, by contrast, requires 
these things, and indeed may require that punishment should cease after 
moral reform has been achieved.91   
 
III. THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL IN PRACTICE I: STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 
 
      I have already mentioned how rehabilitation in some of its guises 
has appeared in older federal and Supreme Court cases.  But discussions 
about the meaning of rehabilitation have played a significant role in two 
recent cases besides Graham, although the focus in these cases was on the 
Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) and its interpretation and use of 
rehabilitation.92  Nonetheless, in Tapia v. United States and United States v. 
Pepper (both decided in 2012), the Supreme Court made more general, 
almost philosophical, statements about the meaning of rehabilitation.  
Interestingly, the statements in the two cases seem to directly be at odds 
with one another (Tapia seems anti- the rehabilitative ideal; Pepper pro-).  
Whether the competing statements can be reconciled in terms of a larger 
principle is the focus of the last section of this part.   
The two cases also form an important backdrop for my reading of 
Graham despite the fact that they were decided after Graham.  Indeed, they 
form a bridge between the history of the rehabilitative ideal and its present 
realty.  Parts of that ideal continue to be in play in the Court’s 
                                         
88 R.A. Duff, Penance, Punishment, and the Limits of Community in WHY PUNISH? HOW 
MUCH? 179 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011). 
89 E.g., MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME (1991).   
90Characterizing punishment is a “reformative enterprise,” Duff, supra note 89 at 179, 
seems fundamentally different than viewing it as a way of giving out “just deserts.”  At 
best, it may be a condition of punishment being “reformative” that it is only given to those 
who deserve it. 
91 Contra Duff, supra note 67.  It may be thought that so-called shaming punishments 
might induce a type of moral reform; I am not sure this is correct.  At least, it is an open 
question whether shaming serves more to degrade the offender than to inspire him to 
reform himself.  It is. however, also an open question whether prison is all in all less 
degrading than shaming punishments.   For my reflections on this, see Flanders, Shame and 
the Meanings of Punishment, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 609 (2006).  
92 For background on the SRA, see STITH, FEAR, ch. 2 (“The Invention of the Sentencing 
Guidelines”). 
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jurisprudence, but mostly the Court is acting against a background of 
pronounced hostility to rehabilitation: a hostility that was codified in the 
SRA, but that the Court also seems to share.  How Graham could 
emphasize the ideal of rehabilitation in this context is addressed in the next 
Part.  
 
A.  The Rejection of Rehabilitation: Tapia 
 
 Tapia concerned the sentencing of Alexander Tapia, who was 
convicted by a jury for being an illegal immigrant into the United States for 
financial gain.93  At sentencing, the judge gave Tapia 51 months in prison, 
but was ambiguous as to the reasons why she was being sentenced to that 
particular term.  According to the sentencing judge, the sentence for Tapia 
had “to be sufficient to provided needed correctional treatment, and here I 
think the needed correction treatment is the 500 Drug Program.”  The judge 
went on: “Here I have to say that one of the factors that—I am going to 
impose a 51-month sentence ... and one of the factors that affects this is the 
need to provide treatment.  In other words so she is in long enough to get 
the 500 Hour Drug Program, number one.”94  In other words, the sentencing 
judge seemed to be indicating that one of the main reasons (if not the main 
reason) that Tapia was being given 51 months was so that she would be 
eligible for drug treatment.95  If drug treatment had not been possible, or not 
available, Tapia would have gotten a lesser sentence.  The Court found that 
the trial judge had erred in extending Tapia’s sentence in order that she be 
able to receive drug treatment, and remanded her case to the 9th Circuit to 
determine whether Tapia’s failure to object to her punishment at sentencing 
meant she was without any remedy.   
 Read narrowly, Tapia is an opinion about statutory construction, in 
particular whether Section 3582(a) of the Sentencing Reform Act made a 
punishment that was imposed, in part or in whole, for the sake of a 
prisoner’s rehabilitation permissible.  That section, in relevant part, 
provided that the court, “in determining whether to impose a term of 
imprisonment, and, if a term of imprisonment is to be imposed, in 
determining the length of the term” should recognize that “imprisonment is 
not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation.”96  
Justice Kagan, writing for the Court, interpreted this to mean that a 
sentencing judge could not impose or increase a convicted person’s 
                                         
93 Tapia, at 2383. 
94 Id. at 2386. 
95 The concurrence disagreed with this assessment.  See id. (Sotomayor, J., and Alito, J., 
concurring).   
96 Id. 
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sentence in order to advance the goal of rehabilitation.  Much like Judge 
Frankel’s position in the Bergman case, the Sentencing Reform Act allowed 
consideration of rehabilitation once a punishment of imprisonment had been 
determined on other grounds, but not in the formulation of the length of 
imprisonment or even whether imprisonment was appropriate.97  
Rehabilitation might be appropriate in choosing a punishment other than 
imprisonment, that is, in rejecting prison as an option.98  But it could not be 
the basis of choosing imprisonment over other alternatives or (more 
importantly for the Tapia case) deciding on a longer term of imprisonment.   
   But the Court sweeps more broadly in construing the Sentencing 
Reform Act, construing it as wholly rejecting almost any except the most 
modest version of the rehabilitative ideal.  Again, the Court is only 
interpreting a statute not giving its own independent judgment of 
rehabilitation, but the emphasis on the SRA’s repudiation of rehabilitation is 
instructive.  Quoting from and relying on its decision in Mistretta, the Court 
noted that sentencing prior to the SRA was “premised on a faith in 
rehabilitation.”99  That faith required that judges and other correctional 
officers be permitted to base “their respective sentencing and release 
decisions upon their own assessments of the offender’s amenability to 
rehabilitation.”100  A prisoner was to stay in prison until he had shown that 
he could be safely reenter society, that is, that he had been rehabilitated.  
Accordingly, release “often coincided with ‘the successful completing of 
certain vocation, educational, and counseling programs within the 
prisons.”101  But this model “fell into disfavor” not only because it resulting 
in sentencing disparities, but more fundamentally, because many began to 
doubt that prison and prison programs could reliably rehabilitate offenders 
(and that officials could tell when prisoners had been successfully 
rehabilitated).102   
 In other words, according to the Tapia Court, the SRA effectively 
repudiated Williams, at least when it came to imprisoning offenders, and by 
doing so pushed courts to move beyond rehabilitation as treatment (and its 
reliance on expert judgment and indeterminate sentencing) and even 
rehabilitation as training (at least on any strong version of that model).  
Determinate sentencing, and not individualized sentences, was now the 
                                         
97 United States v. Mogel, 956 F.2d 1555, 1563 (11th Cir.) (“Rehabilitative considerations 
have been declared irrelevant for purposes of deciding whether or not to impose a prison 
sentence and, if so, what prison sentence to impose.”), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 857 (1992).  
98 Indeed, the statute could be read as positively encouraging options other than prison if 
one had rehabilitation in mind as a goal.   
99 Tapia, at 2386 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989)). 
100 Id. (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363). 
101 Id. at 2386-87 (quoting S.Rep. No. 98-225, p. 40 (1983)). 
102 Id. at 2387. 
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order of the day: judges were constrained in picking and choosing 
punishment based on facts about the offender, and about his capacity for 
rehabilitation.  Rehabilitative training and treatment could go on in prison 
but it could not be treated as a goal of punishment; they were things that 
could occur only after an appropriate punishment had been fixed.  Even 
then, there was little guarantee that any “vocational, educational, and 
counseling programs” within prison would be successful.  If Congress 
wanted courts to be able to mandate rehabilitation as training in prison, the 
Court noted, it would have given them the power to impose training or drug 
treatment on offenders in prison but it notably did not give them that power.  
Courts can only “recommend” training and treatment for offenders who are 
to be imprisoned, and Justice Kagan, in an aside, encouraged them to do 
so.103  But they cannot require it.104   
 
B.  Pepper and the Reaffirmation of the Ideal 
 
 Surprisingly, in the same term as Tapia, the Court reaffirmed its 
holding in Williams in terms that were almost as sweeping as Tapia’s 
rejection of the rehabilitative ideal.  Pepper v. United States involved a 
unique set of facts: Jason Pepper had pled guilty to a conspiracy to 
distribute more than 500 grams of methamphetamine.105  He was sentenced 
to a 24 month term in prison, an almost 75 percent departure from the 
normal sentencing range, and five years of supervised release.106  The 
Government appealed the sentence,107 and two years after the original 
sentencing decision, Pepper’s original sentence was reversed and remanded 
by the Eighth Circuit for resentencing.108  In the meantime, Pepper served 
his 24 month prison term and began a period of supervised release.109  At 
his resentencing hearing in 2006, Pepper and several witnesses testified that 
he had, inter alia, completed a 500 hour drug program,110 no longer was 
abusing drugs, had enrolled in college (and was getting straight As), had a 
part-time job, and had reconciled with his family.   
The district court again sentenced Pepper to 24 months, relying on 
                                         
103 Id. (“So the sentencing court here did nothing wrong—and probably something very 
right—in trying to get Tapia into an effective drug treatment program.”).  
104 After Tapia was decided, a circuit split quickly developed on its meaning regarding a 
revocation of supervised release.  See Paul Berman, Quick Circuit Split on Tapia’s Impact 
For Supervised Release, SENTENCING LAW & POLICY (July 20, 2011). 
105 Pepper, at 1236. 
106 Id. at 1242. 
107 Id. at 1237. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 1232. 
110 Id. Interestingly, this seems to be the same program that was at issue in Tapia. 
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Pepper’s postsentencing rehabilitation and explaining it would not advance 
“any purpose of federal sentencing policy or any other policy behind the 
federal sentencing guidelines to send [Pepper] back to prison.”111  The 
government appealed and Pepper’s sentence was once more reversed and 
remanded to the district court.112  In its ruling, the Eighth Circuit explained 
that the district court had abused its discretion in considering postsentencing 
rehabilitation as a sentencing factor, both because it was not “relevant” and 
“would create unwarranted sentencing disparities and inject blatant 
inequities into the sentencing process.”113  At Pepper’s second resentencing 
hearing in 2008 (and third sentencing hearing overall), Pepper and others 
again testified to Pepper’s continuing rehabilitation (he was still attending 
school and still working, but also had recently married).  This time, the 
district court rejected Pepper’s request for a downward variance, and Pepper 
was sentenced to 65 months.114  After losing at the Court of Appeals, 
Pepper appealed to the Supreme Court.115  He won. 
The Court defended the right of judges at sentencing to consider all 
factors in sentencing, even evidence that was not available to the original 
sentencing judge.  In favoring broad discretion, the Court found its most 
germane precedent in Williams, the case in which the Court had most 
blatantly adopted aspects of the rehabilitative ideal.  “We have 
emphasized,” the Pepper Court said, quoting Williams, that “highly 
relevant—if not essential—to [the] selection of an appropriate sentence is 
the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the 
defendant’s life and characteristics.”116   
The language the Pepper Court quoted from Williams is the 
language that the rehabilitation as treatment model bequeathed to the Court: 
experts and judges need to have full information and wide latitude when 
sentencing, because the idea behind sentencing is not to give a “one size fits 
all punishment but to tailor or “individualize” a punishment based on the 
particularities of each offender.  As the Court also quoted from Williams, 
“the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime.”117  The 
best sentence is the right prescription based on an individualized diagnosis 
that will lead to the offender’s rehabilitation.118  Indeed, Pepper goes even 
                                         
111 Id. at 1237. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 1237-38. 
114 Id. at 1238. 
115 Id. at 1239. 
116 Id. at 1235 (quoting Williams, at 246-47). 
117 Id. at 1240 (quoting Williams, at 247). 
118 See Williams, at 247 (“The belief no longer prevails that every offense in a like legal 
category calls for an identical punishment without regard to the past life and habits of a 
particular offender.”). 
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further than Williams did, emphasizing the need to consider evidence of the 
offender’s character not only before but even well after the moment of 
conviction.   
Of course, the Pepper Court did not connect individualized 
punishments to the need for rehabilitation as treatment; then again, neither 
did the Williams Court.  But recall that rehabilitation as training also 
required that sentences be individually tailored.  In this regard it is revealing 
what additional facts the district court in Pepper’s resentencing thought 
especially relevant, viz., the fact that he was attending college, held a steady 
job, that he had reconciled in his family.  In short, Pepper had rehabilitated 
himself, not in the sense that he was sick and getting better (the 
rehabilitation as treatment model) but in the sense that he was well on his 
way to becoming a fit and productive member of society (the rehabilitation 
as training model).  
The inference is almost impossible to miss: Pepper was getting a 
lower sentence because he was getting rehabilitated outside of prison and so 
would need fewer years of rehabilitation inside prison.  The Pepper Court 
held as much.  Evidence of Pepper’s rehabilitation prior to his sentencing 
was relevant because it was “highly relevant to several” of the statutorily 
mandated factors judges were to consider at sentencing, including the 
purpose of “provid[ing] the defendant with needed educational or 
vocational training.”119  Sentences should be individualized, Pepper held, 
and one of the things that matters to individualization is whether the 
offender needs (or in Pepper’s case, doesn’t need) rehabilitation.  
Rehabilitation, in short, is a sentencing factor.   
 
C.  Reconciling Tapia and Pepper 
 
   Can the two cases – decided in the same Supreme Court term – be 
reconciled?  At a high enough level of abstraction, Tapia and Pepper go in 
strikingly different directions.  Tapia repudiates Williams; Pepper embraces 
it.  As far as the interpretation of the Sentencing Reform Act, Tapia seems 
to have the better story.  Indeed, Alito picked out the majority’s reliance on 
Williams in Pepper for special ridicule.  “Anyone familiar with the history 
of criminal sentencing in this country cannot fail to see the irony in the 
Court’s praise for the sentencing scheme exemplified by Williams,” Alito 
wrote.120  But, he continued, “[b]y the time of the enactment of the 
Sentencing Reform Act in 1984, this scheme had fallen into widespread 
                                         
119 Pepper, at 1242.  
120 Pepper, at 1256 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Williams, at 
241). 
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disrepute.”121  He rejected the Court’s opinion in Pepper as an ill-advised 
“paean” to the “old regime.”122       
More substantively, the two decisions are at odds in whether 
rehabilitation is a sentencing factor.  Tapia reads the SRA and particular 
provisions of it as positively removing rehabilitation as a factor for judges 
to consider.  Pepper favors judges considering an offender’s past 
rehabilitation as relevant to whether he needs further rehabilitation.  Trying 
to find a distinction between the two uses of rehabilitation seems 
formalistic.  We could say that Tapia is about using rehabilitation to 
increase a sentence, whereas Pepper is about using rehabilitation to 
decrease a sentence.  But then both are still ways of using rehabilitation as a 
sentencing factor.  If prison is not an appropriate means for promoting 
rehabilitation at all (as the statute at issue in Tapia suggests) then it should 
not have been a relevant factor in Pepper’s case.  But it seems obvious that 
rehabilitation was a driving factor in at least one of Pepper’s sentencing 
decisions: because Pepper was already rehabilitated, he needed less 
rehabilitation in prison.  If Tapia is correct about rehabilitation as a 
sentencing factor, then Pepper seems wrongly decided and vice versa. 123   
But there may be a way we can give more substance to the seeming 
formalism.  Suppose we take Tapia’s rule not to be the blanket one that 
sentencing cannot be used as a factor when sentencing someone to prison; 
suppose, instead, we take it to be that, because prison is bad for 
rehabilitation.  If prison is bad for rehabilitation, then judges should never 
factor in someone’s need for rehabilitation when considering whether to 
increase his term in prison.  But by the same token, if prison is bad for 
rehabilitation, then judges should factor in someone’s need for 
rehabilitation when considering whether to decrease his term in prison (or 
not to sentence him to prison at all).  In short, the SRA doesn’t dictate that 
judges should never consider someone’s need for rehabilitation.  It dictates 
that judges should consider someone’s need for rehabilitation only when it 
means that they should get less time in prison.  The principle that emerges 
of out of the cases then is: prison is bad for rehabilitation.  Under this 
principle, both Tapia and Pepper  were correctly decided because they both 
did not use rehabilitation as a factor that might increase prison time, Tapia 
                                         
121 Id. at 1256 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
122 Id. at 1257 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
123 If we extend the logic of Pepper further, its tension with Tapia becomes even more 
manifest  Suppose Pepper had done bad things prior to his conviction (he had lost his job, 
or gotten a divorce, or flunked out of school), then presumably these facts would be 
relevant, but relevant because they showed the need for further rehabilitation.  If Pepper’s 
good acts are relevant to decreasing his sentence because he has already been rehabilitated, 
then his bad acts would seem to be relevant for the same reason: because they show the 
need for more rehabilitation.   
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because it rejected a longer sentence and Pepper because it licensed a lower 
sentence.   
Viewed in this light, Pepper is as anti-rehabilitative as Tapia.  Both 
opinions are aware that rehabilitation programs are available in prison.  But 
such programs are only relevant, if they are relevant at all, if prison time is 
going to be imposed anyway.  If punishment is to be imposed, it is probably 
a good thing to commend them.  The model at play here is mostly 
rehabilitation as training but in the modest way Judge Frankel endorsed 
it.124  Judges should be aware that rehabilitative programs are there for 
prisoners, just don’t operate under the idea that prison is being imposed for 
rehabilitation -- whether by itself or in conjunction with educational, 
vocational, or treatment programs.  At best, rehabilitation is something that 
should be pursued outside of prison (including while supervised by the 
criminal justice system), but never in prison.125     
 
IV. THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL IN PRACTICE II:  THE CONSTITUTION 
 
 Graham was a Constitutional decision and not a statutory one, and it 
was decided before both Tapia or Pepper.  Nonetheless, its emphasis on 
rehabilitation is striking.  Both Tapia and Pepper show an awareness of the 
doubt about rehabilitation that resulted in Congress passing the SRA, an 
awareness that predates those cases.126  And when set against other 
constitutional cases discussing punishment, Graham’s focus on 
rehabilitation is an outlier.  In Roper, the case that prior to Graham and 
which Graham most closely resembles, the focus was on retribution and 
deterrence, and whether the death penalty was a proportional punishment 
for children who are found guilty of murder.127  It barely mentioned 
rehabilitation, which given Graham, seems odd.  Death forecloses 
rehabilitation at least as much life without parole does (if not more).128  
                                         
124 For a reading of Tapia along these lines see William Peacock, Prison is for Punishment, 
Not Rehabilitation?   FINDLAW:: U.S. FOURTH CIRCUIT (Oct. 31, 2012) at 
http://blogs.findlaw.com/fourth_circuit/2012/10/prison-is-for-punishment-not-
rehabilitation.html.   
125 Thanks to Eric Miller for helping me to see this point more clearly.   
126 See Mistretta v. United States  488 U.S. 361 at 366 (“Serious disparities in sentences, 
however, were common. Rehabilitation as a sound penological theory came to be 
questioned and, in any event, was regarded by some as an unattainable goal for most cases. 
See N. Morris, The Future of Imprisonment 24-43 (1974); F. Allen, The Decline of the 
Rehabilitative Ideal (1981).”).     
127 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005). 
128 Although cf. Meghan Ryan, Death and Rehabilitation, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1231 
(2013) (death sentence not incompatible with rehabilitation); Chad Flanders, The Case 
Against the Case Against the Death Penalty, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 595 (2013) (same).  
Perhaps the Court thought it went without saying that death cannot rehabilitate.  But in 
 THE SUPREME COURT AND THE REHABILIATIVE IDEAL 25 
Why was rehabilitation so important in Graham, and equally as important, 
what did Graham mean by rehabilitation? 
 
A.  Graham’s Rehabilitative Holding 
 
 The early response to Graham understandably focused on its 
extension of the “evolving standards of decency” test beyond the death 
penalty to sentences to life without parole.129  Whether the Court’s 
reasoning will be extended to other sentences and other groups (besides 
juveniles) still remains to be seen, and is the focus of much good work in 
the area.130  But Graham’s more lasting impact may be its renewed 
emphasis on rehabilitation.  Indeed, the fact that life in prison without 
parole foreclosed “the rehabilitative ideal” (as the Court put it)131 is central 
to its holding.  Indeed, it is perhaps the theme of the opinion, as well the 
basis of some of its more moving passages.     
Consider in this regard how the Graham Court treats incapacitation 
as one of the legitimate goals of punishment, which is illustrative.132  Even 
here, prior to the Court’s explicit discussion of rehabilitation as a purposes 
of punishment, rehabilitation creeps in. Incapacitation is a valid rationale 
for punishment, Justice Kennedy writes, but not here, because “[t]o justify 
life without parole for juveniles” requires a judgment that the juvenile will 
be a danger to society forever, which is to say, a judgment that the juvenile 
is incorrigible.133  Kennedy goes on that a judgment of incorrigibility will 
be very difficult to make.  It will be hard to decide whether a juvenile’s 
crime is the result of “transient immaturity” or the result of “irreparable 
corruption.”134 
So far, Kennedy’s point is relatively modest, and for that reason also 
vulnerable.   The fact that it may be hard to find those who are irreparably 
corrupt does not mean that no juveniles might be irreparably corrupt, and 
that a legislature might rationally target those who are.  At least at this 
point, the argument only suggests stricter standards or closer analysis for 
                                                                                                       
Graham, that fact alone – that a punishment may foreclose rehabilitation – does real work 
in showing that the punishment is unconstitutional.  My question is: why was that work not 
done in Roper, or at least hinted at?      
129 See supra note 2. 
130 See supra note 1.   
131 Graham, at 74. 
132 Lynn Branham (in conversation) has stressed how rehabilitation plays multiple roles in 
Graham: as part of its proportionality analysis, as part of its analysis of the purposes of 
punishment, and in its discussion of a case-by-case approach to sentencing.  I agree.  My 
analysis here (as the text says) is illustrative, not exhaustive.   
133 Id. at 74. 
134 Id. at 68. 
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deciding who gets life without parole, a point emphasized by Justice 
Roberts in his concurring opinion.135  We don’t need a categorical ban on 
life without parole, just a more carefully targeted limit.  Some juveniles 
may really be incorrigible, and so we might want to incapacitate them.       
But what Kennedy says next in his opinion rules this out.  For, he 
writes, “[e]ven if a State’s judgment that Graham was incorrigible were 
later corroborated by prison misbehavior or failure to mature, the sentence 
was still disproportionate because the judgement was made at the outset.”136  
That is to say, even if incapacitation is fully warranted (and so a rational 
and just punishment), the state cannot engage in it by imprisoning juveniles 
in life without parole.  Why?  The answer, which becomes clearer in the 
Court’s explicit discussion of rehabilitation, is that the state cannot 
foreclose the possibility at the outset that the offender could be 
rehabilitated.  Incapacitation is not an acceptable rationale for punishment 
because it rules out the offender ever changing for the better.  In short, 
rehabilitation as a purpose of punishment trumps incapacitation, even when 
incapacitation is justified.   
Rehabilitation is the last purpose of punishment Kennedy discusses, 
although (as we just saw) shapes the discussion of the purposes of 
punishment that went before it.137  Again, as with incapacitation, a sentence 
to life without parole passes a judgment on the juvenile and his “value and 
place in society,” viz., that he is “incorrigible” and can never “reenter the 
community.”138  It is cruel to say to a juvenile offender that he is 
“irredeemable” and that he will never mature enough or be rehabilitated 
enough to earn release.  As the Court eloquently puts it later in the opinion, 
“[l]ife in prison without the possibility of parole gives no chance for 
fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, 
no hope.”139  This, the Court says, is cruel and unusual.  The Constitution 
requires giving juveniles the opportunity to show that they can be 
rehabilitated, “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on 
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”140 
 
B.  Graham’s Two Models of Rehabilitation 
 
 Graham’s rhetoric is sweeping, which we might expect from Justice 
                                         
135 Graham at XX (Roberts, J., concurring).   
136 Id. at 73. 
137 Rehabilitation figures in the proportionality analysis, too: life without parole is 
disproportionate to the juvenile’s offense precisely because it expresses a judgment of 
incorrigibility.   See id. (judgment of incorrigibility at the outset is “disproportionate”).   
138 Graham, at 74. 
139 Id. at 79. 
140 Id. at 75.   
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Kennedy.  But what does the rhetoric mean?141  What in particular does 
Kennedy mean by not giving up on the “rehabilitative ideal”?  Two models 
of rehabilitation seem to be working in Graham, with one ultimately more 
important than the other.  Graham occasionally alludes to, and twice makes 
explicit, the ideal of rehabilitation as training.  But the rhetoric, and the 
overall thrust of Graham fit more comfortably within the ideal of 
rehabilitation as moral reform. 
 The initial reference Graham makes to the model of rehabilitation as 
training comes in its discussion of the rehabilitative purpose of punishment.  
The Court cites an amicus brief noting that those sentenced of life without 
parole “are often denied access to vocational training and other 
rehabilitative services.”142  Juveniles, the Court adds, are most in need of 
these services.  A little later, the court hits the point again: “it is the policy 
in some prisons to withhold counseling, education, and rehabilitation 
programs for those” who are ineligible for parole.143  In other words, life 
without parole means not only no hope of release, but a denial of 
opportunities for rehabilitation in the form of vocational and educational 
programs.  When these passages are combined with idea that juveniles must 
be able to have a “meaningful opportunity” to obtain release, the 
rehabilitation as training model’s influence is patent: prison is a place where 
juveniles, if they work at it and have the right kind of support, can become 
fit and productive members of society and so can be released into society.  
Denying them these services “reinforces” the judgment that the juvenile is 
irredeemable, what Kennedy calls a “perverse consequence.”144  
 But if the rehabilitation as training model were the only model the 
Court had in mind, then the Court’s opinion, I believe, would have a very 
different shape and tenor.  It would not just mention that programs should 
not be closed off to juveniles, it would positively require those programs be 
available to them.  After all, it would be cruel to say that juveniles should be 
given the hope of release while denying them the tools they need to achieve 
that release (in this way, as the Court says in a striking passage, the prison 
system comes “complicit” in the denial of opportunity145).  But the Court 
does not entirely go this way.  Instead, it explicitly leaves it open to the 
“State, in the first instance, to explore the means and mechanism for 
compliance” with the Court’s instruction that juveniles must be given a 
                                         
141 For a philosophical look at Kennedy’s rhetoric of hope see Ristroph, Hope, supra note 
23. 
142 Id. at 74. 
143 Id. at 79. 
144 Id.  
145 See id. (“In some prisons, moreover, the system itself becomes complicit in the lack of 
development.”). 
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“meaningful opportunity” to obtain release.  “It is for legislatures,” the 
Court says, “to determine what rehabilitative techniques are appropriate and 
effective.”146  
Note three things about the Court’s phrasing here.  First, it is a 
matter for the State in particular the legislature, and not the Court, to find 
ways to comply with the Court’s mandate.  In other words, there is no 
particular form or type of specifically rehabilitative “opportunity” that is 
required.  Second, and more revealingly, the State need in the end only 
explore means and mechanisms for compliance.  It need not, that is, actually 
implement any of these means and mechanisms, at least not yet.  Indeed, 
one could imagine that legislatures might determine, and even reasonably 
determine, that “nothing works,” so that no rehabilitative programs are 
offered.147  Third, and most important, what the Court is referring to is not 
means and mechanisms of rehabilitation, at least not directly: the Court is 
referring to means and mechanisms of release. This is not the language of a 
Court that is requiring states adopt the model of rehabilitation as training.   
It implies at most that the inmate must have at least an opportunity to prove 
he has matured; this is his “opportunity,” not the opportunity for 
educational and vocational programs per se.  In fact, the Court’s language 
here may just be a long way around to saying that the longest permissible 
sentence for juveniles is life in prison with the possibility of parole.148      
If this is all Graham requires, then we might worry about the gap 
between Graham’s rehabilitative rhetoric and its remedy; the rhetoric of 
rehabilitation as training is mostly hortatory.  States post-Graham will have 
to give juveniles like Graham an opportunity, eventually, for release.  But 
then do not have to make it any more possible in reality for juveniles to 
rehabilitate themselves and so win release.  “Meaningful opportunity for 
release” becomes more about the preconditions of release than the 
conditions of confinement, and the implementation of Graham becomes 
(merely) about specifying those conditions.149   All the same, states may 
                                         
146 Id. at 73-74.   
147 Again, Kennedy’s opinion is careful (almost too careful): he rejects the idea that life in 
prison without parole for juveniles might lock them out from rehabilitative programs.  This 
is bad, Kennedy says.  But nothing in his opinion holds that states have an obligation, in the 
first place, to institute those programs.   
148 Thus Graham does not lead in any straightforward way to creating a “right to 
rehabilitation.”  Aaron Sussman, The Paradox of Graham v. Florida and the Juvenile 
Justice System, 37 VT. L. REV. 381, 385 (2012) (collecting citations on the “right to 
rehabilitative treatment”).  See also. Sally Terry Green,  Realistic Opportunity for Release 
Equals Rehabilitation, 16 BERKLEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 13 (2011) (Graham “empowered the 
States to formulate appropriate and effective rehabilitative techniques”).  
149 See Drinan, supra note 13; Sarah French Russell, Review for Release, 89 IND. L. J.  373 
(2014) (Graham about conditions for release, not right to rehabilitation). 
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make rehabilitative programs available to juveniles, but this is not required 
of them.150 What is required is the possibility of release, not rehabilitation 
and not even the possibility of rehabilitation. 
 Is the rhetoric of rehabilitation in Graham empty then?  Not entirely, 
and not if we keep in mind that rehabilitation as training is only one 
possible mode of the rehabilitative ideal.  There is second strain in the 
Court’s opinion, one that does not focus so much on rehabilitative programs 
that the state has to offer, than on the possibility of the offender himself 
undertake his own moral reform.  Recall that in the model of rehabilitation 
as moral reform that reform is not so much the result of prison vocational or 
educational programs; instead, the reform comes about from the 
individual’s own reflection and remorse.  What the state has to do is hold 
out hope for the maturation and moral reform, even if (and perhaps 
especially if) it cannot compel it.   
Justice Kennedy’s rhetoric echoes the principles of the older reform 
model of rehabilitation almost precisely.  The state does not have to give 
Graham access to any rehabilitative programs (although it should not deny 
them to him when he is in prison).  Rather, the goal is ultimately Graham’s 
rehabilitation of himself.  In one passage, Justice Kennedy writes, that 
“[m]aturity” – not prison, not training – “can lead to that considered 
reflection which is the foundation for remorse, renewal, and 
rehabilitation.”151  And, in an especially vivid paragraph, Kennedy writes 
that with a sentence of life without parole, Terrence Graham has no 
meaningful opportunity to obtain release “no matter what he might do to 
demonstrate that the bad acts he committed as a teenager are not 
representative of his true character, even if he spends the next half century 
attempting to atone for his crimes and learn from his mistakes.”152  Training 
programs may help Graham at the margins become a more productive 
society, but it is only his own reflection and remorse that can lead to his 
atonement.   
What the rehabilitation as reform model positively prohibits are 
punishments that say to the offender he cannot reform.  If punishment is to 
aim at reform, it cannot at the same time make the “expressive judgment”153 
that a person will never reform and be able to reenter society.  In other 
words, if the intent behind punishment is that the person reform, the 
punishment cannot simultaneously convey the judgment that the person 
cannot reform.  But this judgment is what (by Kennedy’s light) juvenile life 
                                         
150 In the language of the Tapia opinion, Graham seems to say that probably a lot of good 
can come from rehabilitation as training, but there is no constitutional mandate for it.   
151 Id. at 79. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 74.   
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without parole expresses: that the juvenile is incorrigible.154  Indeed, it is 
this disqualifying aspect of life without parole that is the basis of the 
opinion’s most eloquent passage: “[l]ife in prison without the possibility of 
parole gives no chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for 
reconciliation with society, no hope.”155  Note what disqualifies the 
punishment in the first instance: the judgment that the punishment makes, 
viz., that the offender is without hope of reform.  The punishment is not 
wrong for what it does to the offender, but for what it says to him, at the 
outset, about his possibility for moral reform.           
 This rhetoric matches precisely rhetoric of rehabilitation as moral 
reform.  As Jean Hampton puts it in her article on punishment as moral 
education the state must never “regard any one it punishes as hopeless, 
insofar as it is assuming that each of these persons still has the ability to 
choose to be moral.”156  Or consider also Antony Duff’s statement of the 
moral reform view as one which believes that “we can never have morally 
adequate grounds—nothing could count as morally adequate grounds—for 
treating a person as being beyond redemption.”157  Because life without 
parole regards juveniles as “hopeless” and treats them as “beyond 
redemption,” it is prohibited as a punishment.  It is one thing if a 
punishment denies juveniles training.  It is quite another thing if it denies 
juveniles hope, to “imply that those subject to [life without parole are to be 
permanently and irrevocably expelled from ordinary community with their 
fellow citizens.”158 
Thus Graham’s basic rehabilitative holding: the State cannot 
discourage a person from reforming by how it sentences.  And if the state 
does not discourage reform, reform may happen, perhaps just by dint of 
juveniles growing older and maturing.  “Maturity” is another key word in 
Graham, and it too fits with the model of rehabilitation as moral reform.  
The state cannot make you “mature”; it is process one undergoes, more or 
less actively, by slowly taking responsibility for yourself.  In fact, too much 
interference can end up hindering one’s moral growth. 
But now we may have a worry about the logic of this argument and 
about the model of rehabilitation as reform more generally.  According to 
that model, nothing stops reform from happening in prison (through 
reflection and maturity) and indeed, one might be reformed in prison and 
                                         
154 See id. (“Maturity can lead to that considered reflection which is the foundation for 
remorse, renewal, and rehabilitation.  A young person who knows that he or she has no 
chance to leave prison before life’s end has little incentive to become a responsible 
individual.”). 
155 Graham, at 79.   
156 Hampton, supra note 67, at 231.   
157 Duff, supra note 67, at 266.  
158 Duff, supra note 78, at 185.   
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yet never be released.   Moral reform, in other words, is a good in itself, 
even if it does not have release as its eventual reward.  Indeed, if offenders 
reform only for the sake of being released, we may wonder whether this 
might corrupt their efforts at moral reform not only by encouraging the 
pretense of reform when none has occurred, but more generally by giving 
offenders the wrong incentives to reform: offenders should show remorse 
because they are remorseful, not because they want to get out of jail.       
On purely moral reform grounds, there does not seem to be any 
disjunct between remaining in prison and being reformed (nor for that 
matter, need there be any disjunct between being sentenced to death and 
being morally reformed159).  But again, what is important in Graham may 
be less about release per se and more about the message the impossibility of 
release sends: the state saying that it will never release you seems to entail 
that you will not and cannot be reformed.  By the same token, saying that 
the state must give you a chance of being released strongly suggests that 
you can be morally reformed.  What is important is that the state give you 
hope, rather than a firm guarantee of release.160  Some juveniles may not, in 
fact, ever be released and so their hopes will remain just that; but they 
cannot be denied hope at the outset.  Indeed, the judgment at the outset is 
the main wrong of life without parole and constitutive of that judgment is 
disallowing any meaningful opportunity for release.  
That this is a rather constrained vision of rehabilitation can be 
shown by the fact that rehabilitation as moral reform is compatible with the 
“prison is bad for rehabilitation” that was the principle of Tapia and Pepper.  
Tapia and Pepper could be reconciled because they both said that one could 
never sentence someone to more prison time because that person needed 
more rehabilitation.  Prison just couldn’t (reliably) be counted on to 
rehabilitate people.  Note, though, Justice Kennedy doesn’t require that 
prison rehabilitate juveniles.  Rehabilitation programs in prison are nice, but 
not required by the Constitution.  Nor does prison in general have to be a 
place where people usually get better.  Nothing in Graham entails that 
prison is good for rehabilitation, and that juveniles should be incarcerated 
because incarceration will rehabilitate them.  Graham is not a departure 
from Tapia and Graham in the end; it accepts their skepticism about the 
desirability of prison as a place for rehabilitation.  It only says that a 
sentence to prison cannot be one that denies any hope that they will reform.  
Whether the odds of reform are high or (more probably) low is in a way 
beside the point.  The state can’t by its sentencing rule out moral reform and 
release; this the model of rehabilitation as reform forbids.   The rest, which 
                                         
159 See supra note 128 (death penalty not incompatible with rehabilitation).   
160 Note that the state does not deny hope by failing to provide rehabilitative programs. 
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is a lot (which is almost everything), is on the offender.161     
C.  Applying Graham and Rehabilitation as Moral Reform 
 
Miller v. Alabama, the follow-up case to Graham that required 
individualized sentencing for juveniles convicted of homicide did not 
extend Graham very far.  It did not strike down life without parole for 
juveniles altogether, as perhaps the logic of Graham dictated.162  If states 
cannot make the judgment “at the outset” that juveniles convicted of 
gruesome and terrible nonhomicide crimes are “incorrigible” and “beyond 
redemption” how does this change for homicide crimes?  Instead, Graham 
focused on the possible disproportion between the culpability of juvenile 
murderers and life in prison without parole.   
In this regard, Miller is a case about the individualization of 
punishments in the (old) retrospective, retributive sense, and not in the 
prospective, rehabilitative sense.163  Youth is relevant in figuring out what 
the offender deserves for what he or she did, not because it may be relevant 
in predicting what he or she might become.  Justice Kagan in Miller says 
almost nothing about the possible future rehabilitation of offenders in 
Miller.  She is not worried about expressing the judgment that some 
juveniles will be beyond redemption, because someone of them will be; that 
is, some of them will really deserve to be in prison for the rest of their lives, 
and die in prison.  She is worried, rather, that the state be certain that those 
who are sentenced to die in prison will be the right ones.164   
Does Graham then lack any bite, any promise for real change?  
Miller suggests that it may and that even extending Graham to categorically 
prohibit life in prison without parole for juveniles convicted of homicide is 
                                         
161 Pushed to its limit, the logic of Graham leads to a kind of paradox.  Graham says we 
have to leave open the possibility of reform in prison.  At the same time, prison is a place 
where reform is very difficult.   I return to this paradox in my conclusion.   
162 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2463-64 (2012). 
163 Perhaps not surprisingly, both Tapia and Miller were written by Justice Kagan.  Tapia is 
hostile to extending punishment for rehabilitation; Miller hardly makes use of 
rehabilitation, mentioning it only in passing.  Miller at 2468.   
164 Comparing Graham to Miller suggest a final way in which Graham subscribes to yet a 
third rehabilitative ideal, this time, rehabilitation as treatment.  Graham’s ultimate 
prescription for juveniles is not only an individualized sentence: it is an indefinite sentence 
subject to proof of rehabilitation.  Of course, the rehabilitation Graham is interested is in 
the moral reform of the offender (his maturity, his remorse, and his atonement from 
reflection), and to a lesser extent, proof that the juvenile can reenter society as a productive 
and contributing member.  It is not proof that the offender has been “cured” of his 
antisocial “sickness,” as the rehabilitation as treatment model held.  Still, Graham says that 
it is only through rehabilitation that the juvenile offender can be released.  Until then, he or 
she must remain in jail indefinitely and possibly until death.   
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not in the cards.165  Those juveniles who kill may indeed be fairly judged to 
be incorrigible at the outset, and be denied hope, although this will require 
an individualized finding.  Nonetheless, we might speculate on some areas 
where Graham might have some influence even if (or because) 
rehabilitation means “rehabilitation as reform.” 
 
1.  Shorter and Lesser Punishments 
 
If Miller suggests that the rehabilitative ideal will not travel all the 
way upward to eliminate all punishments that impose life in prison without 
parole, there is still a possibility that it might affect some lesser sentences, 
including non-prison sentences.  These sentences would be ones in which a 
judgment was made that the offender would never reform, no matter the 
remorse he felt or the efforts at atonement he made.  Grahm said that life 
without the possibility of parole entailed this judgment, but there may be 
other punishments that also imply incorrigibility.  Based on Graham, these 
cases might also be candidates for cruel and unusual punishment, because 
they too would give up the rehabilitative ideal. 
One possible extension of Graham (which may hardly seem an 
extension at all) is to apply it to sentences that are de facto life sentences.  
Graham read very narrowly would apply only to sentences of life without 
parole and not to sentences of years (and Justice Alito cautioned that this is 
all Graham should have been taken to mean166).  But what of a sentence of 
one hundred years without the possibility to parole to a sixteen year old; 
isn’t that the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence?  Or, to 
put it in terms of moral reform: doesn’t such a sentence also make the 
judgment that the person is beyond reform?  A California court in 2012 was 
the first to rule that a sentence that allowed a 16 year old a parole hearing 
only after 100 years was unconstitutional, finding that Graham applied to 
both “life without parole or equivalent de facto sentences.”167   Other courts 
have followed; some have found even shorter sentences to be de facto life 
without parole sentences.168  How to fix exactly how long is too long, 
                                         
165 At least, in the short term.  The logic of Graham on rehabilitation, I think, leads 
inevitably to the conclusion that all life without parole punishments for juveniles are 
unacceptable.  That Miller does not embrace this conclusion shows that the Court is not 
ready to extend Graham’s logic.      
166 Id. at 124 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Nothing in the Court's opinion affects the imposition 
of a sentence to a term of years without the possibility of parole.”).   
167 People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291 (2012). 
168  Floyd v. State, 87 So.3d 45, 45–47 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2012) (eighty-year sentence and 
first opportunity for release at age eighty-five); and Adams v. State, ––– So.3d ––––, ––––, 
2012 WL 3193932, at *2 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App. No. 1D11–3225, Aug. 8, 2012) (sixty-year 
sentence and first opportunity for release around age seventy-six); but cf. Bunch, 685 F.3d 
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however, remains an area of contention among state courts.169    
Another, related extension of Graham involves lifetime punishments 
that do not involve incarceration.  Consider a juvenile sex offender who is 
required to register for the rest of his life and that no showing of 
rehabilitation could ever be sufficient to remove the registration 
requirement.  If sex offender registration is properly considered part of a 
punishment,170 then could a lifetime registration requirement also give up 
on the “rehabilitative ideal”?  A court in Ohio found that a lifetime 
registration requirement did exactly this, although it focused more on how 
registries might make it harder for people to find work, or to integrate into 
the community.171  A clearer route might have been how the fact that the 
ban could never be lifted, nor matter proof of moral reform, was in fact a 
judgment that the offender would never reform, that the state would always 
have to keep an eye on him.  The problem with emphasizing the practical 
difficulties of reintegration is that it could plausibly be said that the original 
conviction was the problem, not the registration.172  Better to hold that the 
state could not rule out ex ante the possibility of moral reform by such a 
sentence, however difficult it might be in practice.  In other words, the 
problem on the rehabilitation as reform reading of Graham is not so much 
the obstacles to rehabilitation but the judgment the state makes at the outset 
that moral reform can never happen.  Such an analysis might be extended to 
                                                                                                       
at 546 (declining to apply Graham to consecutive, fixed-term sentences); State v. 
Kasic, 228 Ariz. 228, 265 P.3d 410 (App.2011) (same); Henry v. State, 82 So.3d 1084, 
1086–89 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2012) ( review granted 107 So.3d 405)(same); and Angel v. 
Commonwealth, 281 Va. 248, 704 S.E.2d 386 (2011) (state statute permitting prisoners at 
age sixty or older who have served at least ten years of their sentence to petition for 
conditional release provides the “meaningful opportunity for release” required 
by Graham ).    
169See People v. Lucero, 2013 WL 1459477, 4 (Colo.App.) (“Defendant argues on appeal 
that, statistically, ‘serving 20 years in prison takes 16 years off life expectancy,’ thereby 
decreasing his natural life expectancy ‘by about 32 years’ before he becomes eligible for 
parole. According to his calculation, his life expectancy is only forty-two years, and 
therefore the point at which he obtains his first opportunity for parole exceeds that 
expectancy.”). 
170 See, e.g., Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999 (Alaska 2008) (sex offender registry “punishment” 
for purposes of ex post facto clause analysis).   
171 In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729 (Ohio 2012); id. at 527 (“Finally, as to the final penological 
goal—rehabilitation—we have already discussed the effect of forcing a juvenile to wear a 
statutorily imposed scarlet letter as he embarks on his adult life. ‘Community notification 
may particularly hamper the rehabilitation of juvenile offenders because the public stigma 
and rejection they suffer will prevent them from developing normal social and 
interpersonal skills—the lack of those traits [has] been found to contribute to future sexual 
offenses.’”) (citation omitted). 
172 See, e..g, Doe at 1011 (considering argument that deleterious effects of registry are 
attributable not to registry, but to conviction for sex offense).   
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other, permanent disabilities offenders might face even after they are 
released: bans that prevent ex-felons from voting, for instance.173 
  
2.  Prison Conditions 
 
 Above, I said that Graham does not require that states provide 
rehabilitative training to juveniles; the most it requires is an opportunity for 
release.  There is a gap between the requirement of a “meaningful 
opportunity” for parole and any possible means to achieve that goal.  This 
gap is problematic only if we think of rehabilitation as training; it is not as 
problematic if we think of rehabilitation as moral reform.  Moral reform is 
in the end something the offender has to do on his own, by reflection and by 
atonement.  Moral reform is nothing that a vocational or educational 
program can bring him to if does not want to be brought to it.  In terms of 
actual, positive requirements, Graham and the moral reform model may 
allow states to get off the hook to a significant degree.     
What rehabilitation as moral reform may require is that prison 
conditions not be so degrading and dehumanizing that they also “send a 
message” that moral reform is impossible.  What Graham prohibited was, at 
bottom, the “expressive judgment” by society that a juvenile was 
incorrigible.174  This message is sent by a sentence of life in prison without 
parole: it says, no matter how much you change, you are still irredeemable 
in society’s eyes.  But a life without parole sentence might not be the only 
way society might send such a message.  Degrading or dehumanizing prison 
conditions might also express that judgment; they also might express to the 
offender that no matter how much he changes, society will nonetheless treat 
him as incorrigible and beyond redemption.  Bad conditions, too, can 
deprive an offender of hope just as certainly as a lifetime prison sentence 
may.  Here, we can give a deeper meaning to Justice Kennedy’s statement 
that the prison system “itself becomes complicit in the lack [of the 
offender’s] development”175 – not by depriving him of rehabilitative 
training, but by removing any possibility that prison is a place where he can 
be reformed, and where the judgment of incorrigibility is “reinforced by the 
                                         
173 Cf. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 54, 57 (1974), where the respondents raised the 
rehabilitative ideal as part of his argument (“Pressed upon us by the respondents, and 
by amici curiae, are contentions that these notions are outmoded, and that the more modern 
view is that it is essential to the process of rehabilitating the ex-felon that he be returned to 
his role in society as a fully participating citizen when he has completed the serving of his 
term.”) (emphasis added).   
174 The message may be reinforced by a lack of rehabilitative programs for the offender; 
but the message is, in the first instance, conveyed by the punishment itself.   
175 Graham at 79. 
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prison term.”176  As one moral reform theorist put it, a punishment cannot 
aim at “degrading or brutalizing a person” because this is “not conducive to 
moral awakening but only to bitterness and resentment.”177  
In this way, Graham may connect up to litigation against cruel and 
unusual prison conditions, and not just to litigation against other cruel and 
unusual sentences.178  Prisoners may not have a constitutional right to 
rehabilitation,179 but they may have a right not to be prevented from ever 
achieving moral reform by conditions which treat them as “incorrigible” 
and “beyond redemption.”180  As Alice Ristroph has written, this “negative” 
holding of Graham “could lead to greater scrutiny of solitary confinement, 
security classifications, and other dimensions of prison conditions that 
render a sentence more severe without necessarily extending its duration.”  
This is especially true if we treat rehabilitation as on a par with retribution 
as a purpose for punishment. 181  For retribution, harsh conditions may be 
part of the punishment.182  But rehabilitation as moral reform may put a 
constraint on how harsh conditions can be: they cannot be so harsh that they 
in effect judge the offender to be beyond reform, because they make it 
impossible that he could ever reform.183  
Here, however, we should be mindful of the Court’s jurisprudence.  
In Beard v. Banks,184 for example, the Court seemed to endorse (or at least 
refused to condemn) a prison plan of “rehabilitation through 
deprivation,”185 in which misbehaving prisoners were deprived of 
magazines and other reading material.  “Any deprivation of something a 
prisoner desires,” according to the broader theory, “gives him an added 
incentive to improve his behavior.”186   Such crude efforts at behavior 
control come close to themselves being dehumanizing, to say nothing of 
                                         
176 Id. 
177 Morris, A Paternalistic Theory of Punishment, supra note xx, at 158; see also “By the 
Light of Virtue: Prison Rape and the Corruption of Character,” 91 IOWA L. REV. 561 
(2006). 
178 See generally LYNN BRANHAM, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SENTENCING LAW & 
POLICY, ch. 17.   
179 See Padgett v. Stein, 406 F.Supp. 287, 296 (1975); see also JOHN W. PALMER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 222 (2010). 
180 Graham at xx.   
181 Ristroph, supra note xx, at xx. 
182 See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1991).   
183 See IAN CRUM, A VIRTUE LESS CLOISTERED: COURTS, SPEECH, AND CONSTITUTIONS  
154 (2002) (describing conditions in overcrowded juvenile detention centers where 
children were “handcuffed to iron pipes for extended periods” and concluding “[i]n short, 
the rehabilitative ideal was not realized in practice”).   
184 548 U.S. 521 (2006).   
185 Id. at 541 (Stevens. J., dissenting).   
186 Id.   
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their limited “rehabilitative” potential.  And yet this is only the tip of the 
iceberg of harsh prison conditions which make surviving, let alone 
reforming, in prison barely possible.187  Indeed, under the guide of 
rehabilitation, prison may become harsher rather than more humane.188  In 
the abstract, the ideal of moral reform may prohibit this; practice may be 
something entirely different.189     
 
3.  Adults 
 
 In Roper, the Court emphasized how different juveniles were from 
adults: in terms of their brain development, their susceptibility to influence 
by others, and most ambiguously, their lack of a fully formed 
“character.”190  On the one hand, all of these things made juveniles less 
culpable for their crimes, a theme that also is present in Graham.191  On the 
other hand, and this is a theme present in Graham but not in Roper, this 
state of undevelopedness might make juveniles more and not less capable of 
rehabilitation: they are not yet who they will be; they can mature, and by 
maturing, show that they are not inevitably what their crime might indicate 
them to be.192  They are better that that, or rather who “they” are is not yet 
who they might be over time, and through rehabilitation.  By comparison, 
adults are who they are and so may be more culpable and by the same token 
less capable of future rehabilitation.  Adults are to be punished; children are 
to be rehabilitated.193  Juveniles, in the language of Graham, have a greater 
“capacity to change.”194  
                                         
187 It also shows the dangers of leaving it to legislatures to determine what rehabilitative 
programs work, for nothing in Graham prevents legislatures from presenting 
“rehabilitation through deprivation” as one of the means or modes of realizing the 
“rehabilitative ideal.” 
188 Cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563 (1974) (“With some, rehabilitation may be 
best achieved by simulating procedures of a free society to the maximum possible extent; 
but with others, it may be essential that discipline be swift and sure”).   
189 See also Part V infra.   
190 Roper at xx. 
191 Graham at xx. 
192 Id.   
193 This seems to be a fundamental premise of the juvenile justice system.  See, e.g., 
Carrissa Hessick & Judith Stinton, Juveniles, Sex Offenses, and the Scope of Substantive 
Law,  46TEXAS TECH. L. REV. 5,10 (2013) (“The juvenile justice system was created over a 
century ago.  The goal was to provide children, who were understood to be different from 
adults, with an opportunity for rehabilitation, rather than punishment. When a juvenile 
commits what would be classified as a crime if committed by an adult, that conduct is 
labeled ‘delinquent,’ and the juvenile justice system responds.”) (citations omitted).  See, 
e.g., In re: Gault, 387 U.S. 15-16 (Black, J., concurring) (belief that child is essentially 
“good” means that child is to be “treated” and “rehabilitated” rather than punished). 
194 Graham at xx.   
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 On either the model of rehabilitation as treatment or rehabilitation as 
training, the contrast between adults and children holds.  Children can be 
more easily treated, perhaps.  Their sickness, if that’s what it is, has not yet 
taken root.  The older a person is, the more it takes to recover and be well.  
It may, in fact, be too late to treat some adults.  Children are also easier to 
educate: their minds are still growing.  Not so with adults, who can be 
trained, if they can be trained at all, with greater difficulty.  They are old 
dogs trying to learn new tricks.  On the first two models of rehabilitation, 
children really are different from adults.  In a word, adults are harder to 
rehabilitate, if indeed they can be rehabilitated at all.  Of course, some 
adults will find they can be rehabilitated and some children will resist any 
efforts at rehabilitation.  But if rehabilitation is treatment or if rehabilitation 
is training, the generalization holds for the most part.  
 It is less clear that the contrast stands if we use the model of 
rehabilitation as moral reform, viz., that it will be easier for children to 
reform themselves, to reflect, and to show remorse for what they have done 
and harder for adults.  Couldn’t moral reform be equally possible for both 
of them?  To be sure, it may be easier for some children and harder for 
some adults.  But as a generalization, it seems wrong to judge children 
always more capable of moral reform and adults always as less capable.  
Some kinds of sophisticated moral reform may even be impossible for 
children, that is, a certain level of maturity may be necessary even to start 
the process of moral reflection.195  Even a type of moral conversion seems 
possible even for the most hardened of adults.  More generally, 
contemporary moral reform theorists tend to insist that we should not treat 
any person “beyond civic redemption.”196  If this is right, the rehabilitation 
as a purpose of punishment cannot be limited to sentences that involve 
juveniles.  Whether a punishment leaves open the possibility of moral 
reform should be a constraint on all punishments: we should not give up on 
anybody.  Again, what this entails may be very limited, at least in terms of 
the sentences it applies to.  It may only apply to life in prison without parole 
sentences for juveniles or adults, because only that particular sentence 
expresses the judgment that the person is irredeemable.197      
 
                                         
195 As Graham seems to acknowledge; id. at 79 (“Maturity can lead to that considered 
reflection which is the foundation for remorse, renewal, and rehabilitation.”). 
196 Duff, supra note 78, at 186.   
197 See William Berry, More Different Than Death, Less Different Than Life, 71 OHIO ST. 
L. J. 1139 (2010).   For one court’s rejection of Graham’s application to adults, see 
Commonwealth v. Batts, 66 A.3d 286, 291 (Pa. 2013) (children are different for purposes 
of sentencing in Miller  and Graham).     
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V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 Graham was decided long after the rehabilitative ideal had fallen out 
of favor.  It had stopped, for the most part, acting as an ideal and became 
more of a side consideration to other, more “weighty” purposes of 
punishment such as retribution and deterrence.  Graham does not, and 
cannot, by itself revive the rehabilitative ideal, and I have argued anyway 
that Graham’s version of rehabilitation is rather modest.  It does not entail 
any positive obligation on the state’s part to rehabilitate the offender; it does 
not mandate any vocational or educational programs.  It was decided 
against a backdrop of legislative and judicial hostility to the idea of prison 
as a place for rehabilitation, and it does not directly repudiate that hostility.  
Rather, it only says that society cannot pass the judgment that people will 
not rehabilitation him or herself in prison.  It has to hold out the hope, at 
least for juveniles, that they will be able to reform themselves while they 
are in prison. 
  But Graham has, if only by the centrality of the concept of 
rehabilitation in its holding, put rehabilitation back on the agenda.  It was, at 
the least, a relatively surprising development, although it remains to be seen 
what actual impact its emphasis on the hope of rehabilitation will have.  
There are some stirrings in the lower courts, but they are just that: stirrings.  
Nor has the decision led much in the way of sustained academic reflection 
on the “rehabilitative ideal.”198  Moreover, we should not, I think, dispense 
with skepticism about the two problems that led many to discard the 
rehabilitative ideal.  Identifying rehabilitation as reform is one thing, and a 
necessary step; but endorsing it is quite another thing.   
First, we should consider whether rehabilitation as moral reform is a 
worthy ideal in itself.  Should the state aim to have offender pursue 
remorse, reflection and atonement?  Is this even a valid goal for a liberal 
state?199  Or should the state only imprison with a view towards deterring 
criminals and protecting society.200  Worries about manipulating offenders, 
to get them to believe the right things, plagued the model of rehabilitation 
as treatment.  Similar worries might be raised about rehabilitation as moral 
reform, which displays an intense interest in molding the attitudes, 
emotions, and beliefs of the offender; in short, in shaping the offender’s 
                                         
198 But cf., Ristroph, supra note 13. 
199 I raised such a worry about Duff’s philosophy of punishment in a review of one of his 
books.  See Flanders, R. A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY, 
ETHICS (October 2002). 
200 See generally Flanders, Can Retributivism Be Saved?, BYU L. REV. (forthcoming, 
2014). 
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soul.201  Moral reform is something we might take up qua members of a 
religious community or a family; it may be less appropriate as a goal that 
the state pursues.     
 Second, and perhaps more profoundly, we might still worry whether 
prison can work as a place for rehabilitation at all.  Rehabilitation as reform 
removes the burden on the state to supply offenders with rehabilitative 
services; at least, it does not mandate them, although if they are present, the 
state cannot deny them to juveniles.  I have suggested that rehabilitation as 
moral reform also should not condone brutalizing and degrading prison 
conditions: these, too, can express a judgment that an offender is 
“irredeemable.”  But is even this sufficient?  Tapia, especially, displayed a 
profound skepticism--both legislative and judicial-- that prison could be at 
all compatible with rehabilitation.202  Prison was not to be used for 
rehabilitation, period.  Graham, by contrast, seems to depend on the idea 
that at least rehabilitation is generally possible in prison.  This is not 
inconsistent with thinking prison is not the best place for reform, but it is in 
some tension with it.   
 Suppose that we have good reason to doubt that even the best prison 
could be a place for rehabilitation as moral reform; suppose we even 
thought that most of the time prison positively hinders a person’s project of 
moral reform.  We would then be simply repudiating the vision of those 
who founded the penitentiary, and who thought that confinement and 
meditation could be a path to moral development and maturity, and who 
thought more generally that prison and punishment could cause one to 
reform.   If we depart with the vision of prison as a place for moral reform, 
then we might think that the best thing for juveniles (and for everybody) is 
to find ways to keep them out of prison altogether except when this was 
needed to protect society.  Giving up on this might mean giving up on the 
hope of moral reform in prison.  But if prison is a bad place for reform in 
general, that was a false hope anyway.  Deciding whether to extend Graham 
means, first, deciding whether we should hold out that hope. 
 
  
 
                                         
201 See, e.g., R.A. Duff, Penance, Punishment, and the Limits of Community in WHY 
PUNISH? HOW MUCH? 174 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011) (contrasting liberal values with 
values that “[t]o put it crudely … have to do with the soul, with our inner spiritual or moral 
condition”).   
202 See supra Part III.A 
